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123 S. CT. 2411 (2003)
FACTS
Jennifer Gratz, a white female, applied for admission to the
University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts for the
fall of 1995.' In January of that year, the University notified Gratz that it had
delayed a final decision regarding her admission.2 The school later notified
her that it was unable to offer her admission.3 Gratz thereafter enrolled in the
University of Michigan at Dearborn, from which she graduated in 1999.
4
Patrick Hamacher, a white male, applied for admission to the University of
Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts for the fall of 1997.5
The University delayed and then denied his application.6 He subsequently
enrolled at Michigan State University.7
The University of Michigan's Office of Undergraduate Admissions
changed its admissions guidelines several times between 1995 and 1999.8 In
1995 and 1996, admissions counselors evaluated applications according to
grade point average (GPA) combined with other factors such as quality of an
applicant's high school, the rigor of an applicant's high school curriculum,
geographical residence, and an applicant's unusual circumstances. 9 Those
scores were combined to produce an applicant's "GPA 2" score.'0
Counselors cross-referenced applicants' GPA 2 scores with their scores on
the American College Test (ACT) and the Scholastic Aptitude Test before
deciding how to act on the applications." Applicants with the same GPA 2
score and standardized test score were subject to different admissions
outcomes based on race and ethnicity. 12 "For example, as a Caucasian in-
state applicant, Gratz's GPA 2 score and ACT score placed her within a cell
calling for a postponed decision on her application," whereas an in-state or
out-of-state minority applicant with Gratz's scores would have fallen within
a cell calling for admission.'
3
In 1997, the University modified its admissions procedure by
allowing applicants to receive points for underrepresented minority status,
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socioeconomic disadvantage, attendance at a high school with a
predominantly underrepresented minority population, and
underrepresentation in the units to which the students applied.' 4 In 1998, the
office adopted a selection index on which applicants could score a maximum
of 150 points.15 Each application received points based on grades, test
scores, residency, personal essay, and leadership, among other factors.' 6 An
applicant was entitled to twenty points based upon membership in an
underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group.' 7  The University
established an Admissions Review Committee in 1999 and empowered
admissions counselors to "flag" an application for review by the Committee,
which then determined whether to admit, defer, or deny each flagged
applicant.'
8
In October 1997, Gratz and Hamacher filed a class-action lawsuit in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against
the University of Michigan, the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts,
and two former presidents of the University of Michigan.' 9 Gratz and
Hamacher claimed that the University of Michigan's use of racial
preferences in undergraduate admissions violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,20 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.2 The court granted summary judgment for
the petitioners on the University's admissions guidelines used between 1995
and 1998 but granted summary judgment for the respondents on the
guidelines used since 1999.22 Both parties appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and then made a special appeal to the
United States Supreme Court before the Sixth Circuit reached a decision.23
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.24
HOLDING
The Supreme Court held that the petitioners had standing and that
the University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions procedures violated






19 Id. at 2417-18.
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2003).
21 Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2003).





were not narrowly tailored to achieve the University's interest in a diverse
student body.25 The Court also held that the procedures violated Title VI and
42 U.S.C. § 1981.26
ANALYSIS
The Court began its analysis by addressing Justice Stevens's
dissenting argument that the petitioners lacked standing to seek injunctive
relief.27 The Court found that Hamacher had standing because he alleged
that he intended to transfer to the University of Michigan when defendants
ceased the use of race as admission preference.2' The Court said that
Hamacher's personal stake, in view of both his past injury and the potential
injury he faced at the time of certification of the class, provided a sufficient
basis for standing to maintain the class-action challenge to the University's
use of race in undergraduate admissions. 29  The Court stated that the
differences between the University's use of race in considering freshman and
transfer applicants had no effect upon the petitioners' standing.a
Turning to the merits, the Court applied a strict scrutiny standard of
review of the University's admissions policies.31 Under the strict scrutiny
standard, the Court examined whether the University's use of race in its
admissions program employed narrowly tailored measures that furthered
compelling government interests.3 2 The petitioners argued that the use of
race may only be used to remedy identified discrimination.3 They further
argued that diversity is "'too open-ended, ill-defined, and indefinite to
constitute a compelling interest capable of supporting narrowly-tailored
means."' 34  Finally, even if the University's interest in diversity could
support a compelling government interest, the University did not narrowly
tailor its use of race to achieve such an interest.35 The respondents argued in
response that the University's 1999 admissions program was narrowly
tailored because it resembled the Harvard College admissions program
25 Id. at 2430.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 2422.
28 Id. at 2422-23.
29 Id. at 2426.
30 Id. at 2425.
31 Id. at 2427.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 2426.
34 Id. (citation omitted).
35 Id. at 2427.
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endorsed by Justice Powell in his Regents of University of California v.
37Bakke3 opinion.
In deciding that the University's use of race did not employ narrowly
tailored measures that furthered compelling government interests, the Court
observed that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke did not contemplate that any
single characteristic would automatically ensure a specific and identifiable
contribution to a university's diversity 38 That opinion, as well as Grutter v.
Bollinger,39 envisioned that institutions would consider an applicant's entire
application. 40 By automatically awarding twenty points to applicants solely
on the basis of race, the University's system had the effect of making race
decisive for "virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority
applicant. ' 4' This went against Bakke's emphasis on the importance of
considering each applicant as an individual and assessing all of the qualities
that individual possesses.42
The respondents argued that the University's admissions program
included individual consideration of applications with the creation of the
Admissions Review Committee.43 The Court responded that although the
record did not reveal how many applications the Committee flagged for
individualized consideration, such consideration was clearly the exception
and not the rule."4 Moreover, the individualized review occurred only after
admissions counselors automatically distributed the automatic twenty points
to every minority applicant, thereby making race a decisive factor.45  The
respondents also argued that the volume of applications and the presentation
of applicant information would make individualized consideration of each
36 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding University of California
Medical School's admissions plan unconstitutional). In Bakke, the Supreme Court stated that diversity
was a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education. Id. at 311-12. The Court
struck down the school's admissions policy because it set aside seats specifically for minority students
and failed to evaluate each applicant as an individual. Id. at 319-20. The Court endorsed programs that
consider an applicant's race as a positive factor, without it being decisive. Id. at 317.
37 Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411,2427 (2003).
39 Id. at 2428.
39 Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (holding University of Michigan School of Law's
admissions plan constitutional). In Grutter, the Supreme Court held that student body diversity is a
compelling government interest that may justify the use of race in admissions policies. Id. at 2329. The
Court cited evidence that diversity helps to break down stereotypes, improves classroom discussion,
prepares students for the workforce and citizenship, and permits universities to cultivate leaders. Id. The
Court upheld the admissions policy used by the University of Michigan Law School as a narrowly tailored
means to achieve diversity because it did not use a quota system, it gave individualized consideration to
applicants, it did not unduly harm non-minorities, and it facilitated periodic review to determine whether
racial preferences are still necessary to achieve diversity. Id. at 2330.
40 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 2429.
4 Id.
45 Id. at 2430.
[Vol. 10: 115
Gratz. v. Bollinger
applicant impractical.46  The Court responded that administrative
inconvenience could not render constitutional an otherwise problematic
system.47
CONCURRING OPINIONS
Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Breyer joined in part,
concurred.48  Justice O'Connor stated that the University's admission
procedures did not provide for a meaningful individualized review of
applicants. 49  The selection index precluded admissions counselors from
considering each applicant's individual qualifications, including the
contribution each individual's racial or ethnic identity would make to the
diversity of the student body.50 Furthermore, the addition of the Admissions
Review Committee did not provide a realistic source of individualized
consideration of applicants because the Committee reviewed only a portion
of all applications and executed the bulk of admissions decisions based on
the selection index score parameters. 5'
Justice Thomas concurred.52 Justice Thomas would have held that
the Equal Protection Clause categorically prohibited a state's use of racial
discrimination in higher education." The admissions policy employed by
the University of Michigan suffered not because it allowed racial
discrimination among minority groups, but because it did not sufficiently
allow for the consideration of nonracial distinctions among underrepresented
minority applicants.54 Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, but not in
the opinion.55 Instead, Justice Breyer joined Justice O'Connor's concurrence
56in part and Justice Ginsburg's dissent in part.
DISSENTING OPINIONS
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter joined, dissented.
57
Justice Stevens stated that neither petitioner had standing to seek prospective
relief because both had enrolled at other schools before they filed this lawsuit
6 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 2431.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 2432-33.
52 Id. at 2433.
53 Id.
54 Id.




Wash. & Lee Race & Ethnic Anc. L.J [
and neither had reapplied to the University through the freshman admissions
process. 58 Both petitioners had standing to seek damages as compensation
for the alleged wrongful denial of their respective applications.5 9 However,
because the petitioners faced no imminent threat of future injury, they lacked
standing to obtain injunctive relief to protect third persons from similar
harms.6° Justice Stevens noted that the petitioners could not base standing
upon Hamacher's claim that he intended to transfer to the University because
the transfer policy was not at issue and criteria used to evaluate transfer
applications at the University differed significantly from the criteria used to
evaluate freshman undergraduate applications. 6' Thus, Justice Stevens stated
that Hamacher's claim of future injury was at best "conjectural or
hypothetical" and would have dismissed the writ for lack of jurisdiction.62
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg joined in part,
dissented.63 Justice Souter stated that Hamacher had no standing to seek
declaratory or injunctive relief against the University of Michigan. 64 The
question of whether the freshman admission policy was narrowly tailored to
achieve a diverse student body "should await a plaintiff who is actually hurt
by it."
65
Regardless of standing, Justice Souter believed that the Court should
have upheld the policy on the merits because it did not describe a quota
system similar to the one struck down in Bakke, "which 'insulate[d]' all
nonminority candidates from competition for certain seats." 66  The
University's policy allowed applicants to compete for all seats and valued an
applicant's admission for all seats not only based on race, but on grades, test
scores, leadership, personal character, socioeconomic disadvantage, and
athletic ability, among other grounds.67 Justice Souter noted that "a
nonminority applicant who scores highly in these other categories can readily
garner a selection index exceeding that of a minority applicant who gets the
20-point bonus" and compared the points allocated for race to similar
uncontested allowances for athletic ability or socioeconomic disadvantage.68
Finally, Justice Souter stated that the Court did not have sufficient
information about the operation of the Admissions Review Committee to
59 Id.
59 Id. at 2435.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 2436.
62 Id. at 2438.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 2439.
6 Id. at 2440 (alteration in original).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 2440-41.
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assume that review by the Committee would not result in individualized
assessment of an applicant's contribution sufficient to meet the Court's
standards. 69
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Souter joined, dissented.7 °
Justice Ginsburg stated that the University's policy suffered from no
constitutional infirmity.7' Because the University had more qualified
applicants for admission than it could accommodate, every admitted
applicant was qualified to attend the University.72 The discrimination and
social and legal disadvantages historically faced by racial and ethnic
minorities justified special consideration by the University.73 Because the
University had no intentions of limiting or decreasing enrollment by any
particular racial or ethnic group, did not reserve seats based on race, and did
not unduly constrict admissions opportunities for nonminorities, the policy
was not unconstitutional.74 Finally, Justice Ginsburg stated that in light of
the historical racial oppression in our society and the resulting economic and
social disparities, it is better to allow colleges and universities to maintain
their enrollment through open and honest policies like the one employed by
the University of Michigan.75
CONCLUSION
The Court's ruling leaves room for the use of racial preferences in
undergraduate admissions, subject, as always, to strict judicial scrutiny.76 In
order for admissions policies that use racial preferences to pass muster, they
must be narrowly tailored to further compelling government interests.77 A
university's desire for a diverse student body may constitute a sufficiently
compelling interest to employ racial preferences, so long as the policy
instituted allows for meaningful individualized review of applicants, and
consideration of the contribution each individual's race or ethnic identity will
make to the diversity of the student body.
These requirements make use of racial preferences by large state
institutions difficult given the arduous nature of individually assessing large
numbers of applications. The Court's refusal to recognize the administrative
difficulties inherent in providing individualized consideration presents a
69 Id. at 2442.
70 Id.




75 Id. at 2446.
76 Id. at 2427.
77 Id.
2004]
Wash. & Lee Race & Ethnic Anc. L.J [
significant challenge to large colleges and universities. If such institutions
want to use racial preferences as a way of creating diverse student bodies,
they must observe the rules established in Bakke and recently re-emphasized
in Grutter. In Bakke, Justice Powell stated that "[p]referring members of any
group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its
own sake. ' 8 An institution may deem race or ethnic background a "plus" in
an applicant's file, so long as it examines the applicant's potential
contribution to diversity without race being decisive.79 Justice Powell
emphasized the importance of considering each applicant as an individual
and all of the qualities that applicant possesses. 80 No single characteristic
may be decisive in the admissions process, including race.8 Therefore, large
institutions will have to be creative in ensuring their admissions policies are
consistent with the Court's interpretation of Bakke.
Perhaps most significantly, the Court did not strike down affirmative
action in Gratz. To some, affirmative action is a mechanism for remedying
the residual effects of slavery and the Jim Crow era. The Court found that
affirmative action may create classroom diversity, which in turn promotes a
superior academic experience for all students. Rather than eliminating
affirmative action, Gratz merely endorsed the ground rules established by
Justice Powell in Bakke for how an institution may apply affirmative action
in a higher education context.
Gratz, like Grutter, demonstrates that the Court recognizes the role
that race plays in diversity. The Court expressly admitted that though race
and ethnicity do not determine what individuals think, race and ethnicity
often influence individuals' thoughts. Therefore, racial and ethnic diversity
can be an important tool in creating a student body filled with an array of
ideas, perspectives, and experiences that can enhance the learning of all
students. Educational institutions clearly have an interest in obtaining
diversity of thought, and the use of race and ethnicity in admissions provides
a resource for achieving it.
Supporters of affirmative action will not likely celebrate the Court's
ruling in Gratz. While the decision leaves affirmative action intact, it shows
a lack of understanding by the Court of the strength of the correlation
between race and thought, and insensitivity to the administrative difficulties
inherent in providing individualized consideration to each and every
applicant. The opinion also reveals the Court's lack of trust of colleges and
universities in implementing policies of inclusion and exclusion that achieve
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their educational objectives. The Court has not provided great flexibility to
institutions in fashioning student bodies that they must ultimately educate.
The case also illustrates the philosophical tension between individual
rights and the common good. The petitioners' rights to be treated fairly and
equally in the admissions process was balanced against the campus-wide
benefits of a racially and ethnically diverse student body that stemmed from
the University's admissions policies. In Gratz, the Court tipped the scales in
favor of individual rights. Perhaps it is best to view the decision as a check
on majority rule in favor of minority rights.
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